

Message Text

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R 151305Z JUL 76

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1134

INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 6268

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, PFOR, LE, SY, EG

SUBJECT: VIEWS OF NATIONAL UNITY FRONT SPOKESMAN

REF: BEIRUT 5829

1. SUMMARY: MARONITE DEPUTY DAHER, SPOKESMAN FOR NATIONAL UNITY FRONT (NUF), BELIEVES: 1) THAT 1969 CAIRO ACCORD CAN SERVE AS BASIS FOR SYRIA-PALESTINE AGREEMENT; 2) SECURITY CAN EFFECTIVELY BE RESTORED TO LEBANON IN WAKE OF CEASEFIRE; 3) SYRIANS WOULD BE HESITANT TO ATTACK WEST BEIRUT; AND 4) US ROLE SHOULD BE ONE OF PRESSURING SYRIA TO FIND ACCOMMODATION WITH PLO. END SUMMARY.

2. MARONITE DEPUTY FROM THE AKKAR, MICHEL DAHER, WHO IS SPOKESMAN FOR NUF, PAID CALL ON ME JULY 14.

3. NUF PROGRAM. DAHER DESCRIBED NUF AS ALLIANCE OF LEADING LEBANESE CHRISTIANS AND MOSLEMS WHO HAVE NOT TAKEN SIDES IN CIVIL WAR. NUF PROGRAM IS NOT DETAILED OR EXTENSIVE BUT RATHER IS FOCUSED ON KEY IMMEDIATE ISSUES: 1) PRESERVATION OF LEBANESE TERRITORIAL AND HUMAN UNITY;
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2) SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL; 3) RESPECT FOR CAIRO ACCORDS ON

PALESTINIAN STATUS -- PRINCIPLES HE BELIVES ARE WIDELY ACCEPTED BY WARRING PARTIES. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IS NOT IMMEDIATE NUF CONCERN, BUT NUF POSITION IS GENERALLY, IF NOT ENTIRELY, IN SUPPORT OF FRANGIE'S PROPOSALS, BUT THEY SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO PARLIAMENT FOR APPROVAL. NUF IS OPPOSED TO ANY FORM OF CONFESSIONALISM OR DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ANY GROUP.

4. CAIRO ACCORD. DAHER CLAIMED ARAFAT AND SYRIANS ARE READY TO ACCEPT 1969 CAIRO ACCORD, AND AT NUF MEETING JULY 13, MOSLEM LEADERS KARAME AND SALAM SPOKELIN FAVOR H
OF RETURN TO THIS ACCORD. NUF IS NOW TRYING TO PERSUADE KFOUR FRONT THAT ONLY MARONITE REJECTION OF CAIRO ACCORD PREVENTS AN AGREEMENT. ALTHOUGH ACKNOWLEDGING THAT MARONITES' RECENT VICTORY AT TELL ZAATAR AND THEIR BURNING DESIRE TO CARRY FIGHT TO PPS AND JUNBLATT ADHERENTS ARE OBSTACLES, NUF HOPES THAT SYRIA WILL PRESSURE ITS CHRISTIAN ALLIES TO ACCEPT ACCORDS. DAHER LBAIMED FRANGIE FOR CONTRIBUTING TO PALESTINIAN DIFFICULTY BY ENCOURAGING ARAFAT IN 1973 TO LOOK TO HIS OWN DEFENSE BECAUSE LEBANESE COULD NOT PROTECT PALESTINIANS FROM ISRAELIS.

5. SECURITY. DAHER BELIVES THAT THE ARAB LEAGUE FORCES, WHO ARE BASICALLY ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES, CAN AND SHOULD ENFORCE SECURITY IN LEBANON AFTER A CEASEFIRE. HE AGREED THAT ARAB FORCE WILL NEED HEAVY ARMAMENT. HE IS ALSO CONFIDENT THAT REGULAR LEBANESE ARMY CAN BE QUICKLY RECONSTITUTED, EVEN WITHIN FEW WEEKS, ONCE GENERAL SOLUTION IS FOUND. MOST PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS AND SOLIDERS, HE BELIVES, HAVE STAYED OUT OF CIVIL WAR. ALREADY IN WEST BEIRUT, CONTINUED DAHER, ARAFAT HAD AGREED THAT PLO SHOULD TURN OVER ADMINISTRATION OF WEST BEIRUT TO LEBANESE AUTHORITIES. RE LOCAL SECURITY, NUF HAS ALREADY ISSUED APPEAL TO REGULAR GENDARMERIE TO RESUME DUTIES.

6. POSSIBLE SYRIAN ASSAULT OF WEST BEIRUT. NDAHER SAID SYRIA IS TIRED OF THIS WAR, WHICH IS VERY CONFIDENTIAL

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EXPENSIVE, AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SYRIA IS PREPARED TO MEET ARAFAT HALF-WAY. HE THOUGHT THAT SYRIANS WOULD HESITATE BEFORE CONTEMPLATING ATTACK ON WEST BEIRUT BECAUSE THEY WOULD FIND SUCH AN EFFORT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT AND COSTLY.

7. US ROLE. DAHER THOUGHT US COULD NOT GET INVOLVED DIRECTLY AMONG WARRING LEBANESE PARTIES, BUT COULD

PLAY USEFUL OUTSIDE ROLE. HE THOUGHT MOST USEFUL US
ROLE AT PRESENT MOMENT WOULD BE TO PRESSURE SYRIA TO
FIND AQCOMMODATION WITH PALESTINIANS. HE COULD
APPROACH THIS TASK INDIERECTLY, IF NEED BE, THROUGH
THIRD PARTIES SUCH AS EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA.

8. COMMENT: NUF PROGRAM APPEARS REASONABLE AND
PRAGMATIC AT FACE VALUE, BUT NUF HAS LITTLE POWER TO
SHAPE EVENTS.WHAT NUF PROGRAM CAN DO, PERHAPS, IS
TO UNDERLINE CONCEPTUALFRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE AGREEMENT.
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